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relationship with the excluding PPO.
In this case, the court found that DHJ
was not injured in the aggregate by
its exclusion from SMA since DHJ
soon affiliated with a larger PPO
after leaving SMA. Furthermore, the
court found that consumers were not
injured because the availability of
health care providers to consumers in
the neighborhood was not reduced.
Court FoundEach § 1 Allegation
Lacked Genuine Issues of Material
Fact
Next, DHJ claimed that prices for
hospital services in the market
increased because of Defendants'
antitrust activities. DHJ's expert
economist testified that East
Jefferson's prices were higher than
DIJ's which indicated an antitrust
violation. The court, however,
reasoned that DHJ's expert did not
adequately define East Jefferson's
market power in a meaningful
geographic market. Furthermore, the
court reasoned that price increases
may be indicative of positive aspects
of East Jefferson, such as better
quality services; therefore, DHJ failed
to show that the higher prices were a
direct result of a lack of competition.
DHJ's second § 1 claim was also
rejected by the court. DHJ alleged

that its exclusion from SMA reduced
consumer choice for consumers who
used SMA. The court, however,
found that the number of hospitals
available to patients in general, and
users of SMA in particular, had not
been reduced. The availability of the
hospitals to various customers might
have changed, but any reduction in
hospital availability was insufficient
to decrease market competition.
Furthermore, any price increase that
DHJ was forced to incur due to its
realignment would not eliminate DHJ
as a potential provider to most of its
former SMA patients.
Finally, DIJ's last § 1 complaint
was that it was substantially weakened as a competitor because its
exclusion from SMA caused it to lose
profits and to lose its membership in
a premiere PPO. The court held that,
while injury to a competitor may be
evidence of an injury to market
competition, the specific injury to
DI-IJ was insufficient to create a
factual issue regarding damage to
competition. In fact, DHJ's own
injury was insignificant enough that
its long term viability as a market
competitor was unaffected as it
maintained membership in numerous
managed care plans. Thus, DHJ
showed that it could not compete
without an affiliation with SMA.

CourtRejected the § 2 Claimfor
Failureto ProperlyDefine a Market
Next, DHJ claimed damage
resulting from a violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act, but this claim also
failed because it did not present a
genuine issue of material fact.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act
prevents parties from engaging in
conspiracies to monopolize relevant
markets. To maintain a § 2 claim,
DHJ had to properly define a market
that East Jefferson allegedly was
trying to monopolize. The appellate
court found that DHJ defined its
geographic market too narrowly
because there was too much PPO
patient migration to and from the
market DHJ defined. Thus, the court
concluded that DHJ's § 2 claim
should fail.
In conclusion, although DHJ was
able to establish standing to bring an
antitrust suit, it failed to establish
that there were grounds for such a
suit. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision to
grant Defendants' motion for
summary judgment because Plaintiff
could not present a genuine issue of
material fact to support either its § 1
or § 2 claims.

Medical Device Amendments Act Does Not Preempt All
State Law Claims
by Brad Kenneth Lindow
In Mitchell v. CollagenCorp.,
126 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997), the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, on remand from
the Supreme Court of the United
States, reconsidered its prior holding
in Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67
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F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1995), that the
Medical Device Amendments
("MDA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-k, to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95,
preempted some of Plaintiffs' state
law claims. The Supreme Court

remanded the Mitchells' case and
instructed the Seventh Circuit to
reconsider its prior ruling in light of
the ruling in Medtronic,Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470 (1996). Upon doing so,
the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the
judgment of the district court
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granting Collagen Corporation's
("Collagen") motion for summary
judgment against Plaintiffs Barbara
and Gregory Mitchell ("Mitchells").
The claims that were not preempted
by the MDA were dismissed because
the Mitchells failed to establish
sufficient facts to warrant a trial.
Effects of Zyderm Injections Led
Mitchells to Sue
Barbara Mitchell experienced
serious medical complications after
receiving several injections of
Zyderm in 1988. Zyderm is a product
made by Collagen that is injected
into the skin to replace lost soft
tissue. Since Zyderm is classified as a
Class III medical device - one that is
used "to sustain human life" - the
Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") required Collagen to follow
rigorous procedures to obtain
premarket approval ("PMA") before
introducing Zyderm into the marketplace. The FDA uses the PMA
process to ensure that a product is
reasonably safe and effective under
the MDA. The FDA initially approved Collagen's PMA in 1981 and
reaffirmed its decision in 1991-92.
PreemptionAnalysis Underwent
Round One ofAppellate Review
The Mitchells sued Collagen in
Indiana state court alleging "strict
liability, negligence, fraud,
mislabeling, misbranding, adulteration and breach of warranty." On
removal to federal court, the district
court granted Collagen's motion for
summary judgment based on its
finding that the MDA preempted
Mitchells' state law claims. The
MDA prohibits states from creating
"'any requirement... which is
different from, or in addition to, any
[federal] requirement"' mandated by
the MDA. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). The
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court noted that according to the
MDA regulations, a "state requirement" includes court-imposed
requirements. The district court
concluded that the PMA process was
a requirement under the MDA. Since
common law causes of action would
impose requirements different from
the PMA process, the court held that
these causes of action were preempted by the MDA. Therefore, the
district court dismissed all the state
law claims as preempted by the MDA
except for Mr. Mitchells' loss of
consortium claim, which the court
dismissed because the claim was
derivative to the preempted claims.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the district court, based
in part on preemption grounds.
Rather than reaching a blanket
conclusion that all state law claims
were preempted by the MDA as the
district court did, the appellate court
examined the state law claims
individually to determine whether
each would impose requirements
'different from, or in addition to"'
PMA requirements. Finding that the
state law claims - with the exception of the adulteration, express
warranty, and one fraud claim imposed additional requirements, the
court held the MDA preempted these
claims. The court granted summary
judgment for the adulteration,
express warranty, and one fraud claim
because the Mitchells' evidence was
insufficient to warrant trial. The
Supreme Court, acting on the
Mitchells' petition for certiorari,
vacated the Seventh Circuit's earlier
decision and instructed it to reconsider the Mitchells' claims in light of
its decision in Medtronic.
The Seventh CircuitExamined
Medtronic
In examining the Medtronic
decision, the Seventh Circuit noted
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that the factual situation in
Medtronicwas substantially different
from the case at hand. Specifically,
unlike the present case, the
Medtroniccase involved a medical
device, a malfunctioning pacemaker,
that did not go through the PMA
process. The pacemaker was exempted from the PMA process
because the FDA determined it to be
"'substantially equivalent' to a
device already on the market. 21
C.F.R. § 814.1(c)(1).
The Supreme Court split as to the
proper method of analysis. Justice
Stevens, joined by three Justices,
considered the notion implausible
that common law actions were
preempted. Justice Stevens reasoned
that because Congress considered
medical device safety sufficiently
important so as to require regulation,
it would be peculiar, in effect, to
grant immunity from design defect
liability to an entire industry.
Focusing on legislative intent, Justice
Stevens found that nowhere had the
drafters of the MDA feared that the
state common law system interfered
with the purposes of the MDA.
Instead, Justice Stevens felt the
preemptive term "requirement" meant
a specific legal measure created by a
state legislative or administrative
body.
On the other hand, Justice
O'Connor, joined by three Justices,
reasoned that a common law cause of
action might impose a different or
additional requirement and therefore
could be preempted by the MDA.
Because Medtronic'sdevice was the
substantial equivalent of another
device already on the market and as
such did not go through a process
with any .'requirement[s],"' Justice
O'Connor concluded that the MDA
did not preempt the defective design
claim. Justice O'Connor also
believed that the MDA did not
preempt a cause of action based on a
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failure to comply with federal
requirements because "enforcement
of a federal requirement is not a
requirement 'different from, or in
addition to,' the requirements
imposed by federal law." Nevertheless, these Justices held that some
claims did add requirements and
these claims would be preempted.
Justice Breyer provided the
deciding vote holding that because
the MDA could preempt a state
requirement embodied in a state
statute, rule, regulation, or other
administrative action, it would
similarly preempt a state law tort
action that imposed behavior or a
standard of care. Justice Breyer
concluded that the preemptive
language of the MDA was broad and
ambiguous and thus Congress
intended the courts to rely on the
relevant agency's regulations in
determining what specific causes of
action should be preempted. In
Medtronic,the relevant agency was
the FDA, and the FDA regulation
provided that state requirements are
preempted only when 'specific
[federal] requirements applicable to a
particular device' made 'any existing
divergent State... requirements
applicable to the device different
from, or in addition to, the specific
[federal] requirements."' 21 C.F.R. §
808.1(d) (1995).
From these three perspectives, the
Medtroniccourt unanimously held
that the FDA's "substantially
equivalent" determination did not
preempt the state law claims based on
defective design. Furthermore, the
Court held that a common law action
which mirrors FDA regulations
would not be preempted. Finally,
additional state requirements that
narrow the federal requirements
rather than broaden them would not
be preempted.
Regarding the manufacturing and
labeling claims, the views of Justice
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Breyer and Justice Stevens's camp
formed a majority. Since the FDA's
regulations stated that "state requirements are preempted only when the
FDA has established 'specific
counterpart regulations,"' state law
claims are not automatically preempted. In reviewing cases, courts
"are to be mindful that state requirements of general applicability are not
preempted unless they establish a
substantive requirement for a specific
device and that the federal requirements, to be preemptive, must be
specific to a particular device." The
Court concluded that the MDA
preempted none of the manufacturing
and labeling claims because of the
generality and nondescript nature of
the relevant federal and state requirements.
Seventh CircuitDistinguished
Medtroniefrom the Mitchells'Case
The Seventh Circuit expressed the
difficulty inherent in applying
Medtronic'srationale due to an
apparent tension between the
majority opinion and Justice Breyer's
view that at least some state-based
causes of action are preempted. Even
though the Seventh Circuit found the
Medtronic decision difficult to apply,
the court held that Medtronic
required at least some state-based
common law causes of action to be
considered "requirements" under the
MDA.
In reaching its decision, the
Seventh Circuit held that the PMA
process - unlike Medtronic's
"substantially equivalent" process constituted a specific federal
regulation of a product which could
have a preemptive effect. To determine whether a specific state law
claim is preempted by a MDA
requirement, a court must examine
the claim "at a sufficiently precise
level of generality to determine

whether the final judgment of the
state court would impose on the
manufacturer a burden incompatible
with the requirements imposed by the
FDA." The court found this decision
consistent with those reached in other
circuits.
The Seventh Circuit applied this
holding to each of the Mitchells'
claims. First, the court addressed the
Mitchells' claims of strict liability
and negligence. The court found that
because the "unreasonably dangerous" standard of the strict liability
claim created a requirement different
from the FDA's product-specific
approval of the design, labeling,
performance, etc. in the PMA
process, the MDA preempted that
claim. Likewise, the MDA preempted
the negligence claim because it
imposed a requirement different from
the PMA process. Specifically, a state
court's finding of negligence would
"necessarily conflict" with the FDA's
determination via the PMA process
that the product was safe.
Next the court addressed the
Mitchell's claims of mislabeling,
misbranding, and adulteration. The
court noted that if the claims alleged
that Collagen failed to meet the
requirements created by the PMA
process, the mislabeling and misbranding claims would not be
preempted because they would
merely enforce existing PMA
requirements. However, the Mitchells
did not base their claims on the PMA
process but rather on different
requirements. Thus, the court held
that the claims were preempted.
Additionally, the court held that the
Mitchells failed to present sufficient
evidence to survive summary judgment for the adulteration claim.
Therefore, summary judgment on the
mislabeling, misbranding, and
adulteration claims was proper.
The Seventh Circuit also dismissed all of the Mitchells' fraud
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claims. Regarding the first fraud
claim, that Collagen committed fraud
through its representations to the
FDA during the PMA process, the
court upheld its decision finding that
its original decision was unaffected
by Medtronic. Also, the MDA
preempted the claim that Collagen
had committed fraud through
misrepresentations about the product
for the same reasons that the misbranding and mislabeling claims were
preempted. Furthermore, even though
the Mitchells'claimed fraud in
advertising and promotional materials, the court held that the claims
must fail because an FDA regulation
controlled Collagen's promotional
materials as part of the PMA process
and was preemptive in the absence of
an allegation that the material was
non-conforming.
Finally, the court granted summary

judgment on the Mitchells' warranty
claim even though the vagueness of
the warranty precluded the court from
determining whether an expressed or
implied warranty was alleged. If an
implied warranty claim had been
intended, the MDA preempted it
because of the warranty's interference
with the standards set by the FDA
during the PMA process. If the
Mitchells had intended to submit an
express warranty claim, the claim
would still fail. Since warranties arise
from the parties themselves as part of
their bargain, the court stated that an
express warranty claim would not
necessarily interfere with the PMA
and warrant preemption. However,
since the Mitchells failed to assert a
proper express warranty claim earlier
in the litigation, they were estopped
from doing so now. Therefore, the
court found summary judgment was
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proper.
After reconsidering the
Mitchells' claims in light of
Medtronic, the Seventh Circuit
reaffirmed the district court's
granting of summary judgment to
Collagen on all of the Mitchells'
claims. Specifically, the court held
that the MDA preempts common law
causes of action unless the claims
merely allege non-compliance with
PMA requirements because they
would impose a requirement
"different from, or in addition to"
the PMA process. In arriving at this
conclusion, the court distinguished
Medtronic, holding that it applied
only to products that went through
the "substantially equivalent"
process, as opposed to the PMA
process, which is more specific and
thus within the preemptive scope of
the MDA.

Telemarketing Company Lacked Standing in
Antitrust Suit
By James Saranteas
In Barton & Pittinos,Inc. v.
Smithkline Beecham Corp., 118
F.3d 178 (3rd Cir.1997), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed a district court
decision holding that an injury
alleged by a pharmaceutical marketing company bringing suit was not
the type of injury the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent. Since the
marketing company bringing suit was
not a competitor in the market in
which trade was allegedly restrained,
the marketing company lacked
standing under the antitrust laws.
The Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary
judgment dismissing Barton's
antitrust claims for lack of standing
and dismissing Barton's other claims
for lack of supplemental jurisdiction.
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MarketingPlanLed to Litigation
The litigation sprung from the
broken pieces of a novel plan that
Barton & Pittinos, Inc. ("Barton"), a
pharmaceutical marketing company,
developed to market Smithkline
Beecham Corporation's
("Smithkline") Hepatitis-B vaccine
("the vaccine") to nursing homes.
Barton developed the marketing plan
in response to an Occupational
Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") mandate that was directed
at certain employers, such as nursing
homes, whose employees could be
exposed to the Hepatitis-B virus. The
mandate required nursing homes to
educate their employees about the
Hepatitis-B vaccine and make the
vaccine available to their employees.

In response to OSHA's regulatory
mandate, Barton developed a twopart plan for marketing the vaccine to
nursing homes and presented this
plan to Smithkline, which was one of
only two manufacturers of the
vaccine. Barton and Smithkline then
entered into an agreement to put the
marketing program in action.
In the first part of the program,
Barton was to provide nursing homes
with educational and regulatory
material about the vaccine and
Smithkline would pay Barton a flat
fee. Then, Barton was to phone
nursing homes and solicit orders for
the vaccine. Since Barton lacked the
requisite federal licensing to sell the
vaccine, Barton was to give vaccine
orders that it solicited to General
Injectables and Vaccines, Inc.
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